THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION CONTINUUM
In 1962, New Jersey first enacted the Professional Service Corporation Act.' Late in 1969, this Act was repealed and re-enacted in substantially the same form.2 This revision corrected technical errors and
clarified ambiguities. Specifically, the new statute contains provisions
of particular tax significance. Under this legislation, shareholders
clearly have limited liability.3 Under both the original and current law,
attorneys are permitted to incorporate, subject to the Court Rules.
Simultaneous with the re-enactment of the Professional Service Corporation Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated R. 1:21-lA
which permits attorneys to incorporate under this Act. The additional
requirements of the Court Rule are that the corporation maintain
specified amounts of professional liability insurance 4 and use the word
"corporation" on corporate documents 5.
Most other states have created similar professional corporation
laws.0 The Internal Revenue Service, however, was not willing to accept these organizations as corporations for federal income tax purposes, due to the substantial tax savings from corporate status.
PROFESSIONALS AND CORPORATE BENEFITS

A professional person derives significant economic benefits by
operating as an employee of his own professional service corporation.
The most significant tax benefits are in the area of pension and deferred profit sharing deductions. Under the current Internal Revenue
Code, a corporation may take as an expense deduction amounts contributed to employee pension and profit sharing plans.7 The only limitation is that such deductible expenses may not exceed 10%/ of the
employee's salary for profit sharing 8 and 15% of the employee's salary
for pension contributions, but there are no dollar limitations.9 The
amounts deducted are not taxed to the individual in that year.' 0 In
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. 14:19-1 (1962).
L. 1969 ch. 232, N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:17-1 et seq. (N.J. Sess. L. Service No. 5, 1969).
3 L. 1969 ch. 232 (8), N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A: 17-8.
4 R. 1:21-1A(a)(3).
2

5 R. 1:21-1A(c).
6 1969-5 P-H #41,608.

At the time of this writing all but four jurisdictions (Washington, D.C., Iowa, New York and Wyoming) have legislation or court rules in this area.
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404, 26 U.S.C. 404.
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404(a)(1)(c).
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404(a)(3).
10 INr. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 402.
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qualified plan funds, yearly earnings of the investments are not annually taxed;" but final distribution payments to the employee are
taxed. 12 For amounts contributed to the fund before 1970, the corporate employee may elect to take a lump sum distribution at capital gain
rates. For contributions after 1969, the amount distributed which represents employer contributions is not eligible for capital gains treat13
ment.
Although the partner and sole proprietor may also set aside income for retirement under the so-called Keogh plans, 14 the deduction
is limited to 10% of the individual's income or twenty-five hundred
dollars, whichever'is less.' 5 This difference alone may justify incorporation.
In other areas corporate status confers significant tax benefits, including deductible corporate expenses not taxed to the individual.' 6
The corporation may deduct the cost of medical expenses, reimbursement plans and wage continuation plans. 17 Also the corporation may
deduct the cost of group term life insurance, 18 health and accident
20
insurance 19 and pay up to five thousand dollars in death benefits,
which will not be included in the gross income of the beneficiary.
Before 1971, a corporation with ten or less shareholders could
elect to be a subchapter "S" corporation, 21 in which case the shareholders *did not forfeit the pension, profit sharing, and other tax benefits but had the corporation's taxable income attributed to them
individually. 22 This provision enabled the corporation to avoid the
personal holding company and accumulated earnings taxes. The 1969
Tax Reform Act effectively removes this possibility. Current law limits
the pension and profit sharing deductions to amounts which are equal
23
to the benefits available under the Keogh Plans.
11 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 403, 501.
12 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 402.
13 Iw. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 402(a). This change was brought about in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 P.L. 91-172 § 515(d).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404(e).
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404(e)(1).

16 Berrein Eato.h, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23 TAX
LAW RED. 1 (1967); Professional Corporationsand Associations, 75 HAltv. L. REV. 756 (1962).
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 105.
1S INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 79.
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 105(e).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 101(b).
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1371.
22 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1373; Professional Corporations,supra note 16.
23 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1379. This entire section was added by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 P.L. 91-172 § 511(d).
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STATUS

There are certain disadvantages to operating as a corporation.
Problems of stock valuation may arise at death. Management and
financial control may be more stringent than that required by other
forms of business organization. Although this may be an additional
burden to some professionals, generally it will be to their benefit.
The more significant disadvantages of corporate status include
severe tax penalties, the "accumulated earnings" 25 tax and the "personal holding company" tax. 26 Both taxes may be avoided by proper
tax planning.
The personal holding company tax has become a popular consideration but should not be a major impediment. A seventy percent
tax is imposed upon "undistributed personal holding company income." If fifty percent of the stock of a corporation is owned by less
than five individuals and sixty percent of the corporation's income is
personal holding company income, the corporation will be a personal
holding company.2 7 Professional service corporations meet this income
requirement since personal holding company income is income derived
from personal service contracts. But income received by the corporation
will not be such income if it is attributable to a person who owns less
than twenty-five percent of the capital stock of the corporation. 28 The
seventy percent tax is imposed upon the undistributed personal holding
company income, which is generally equivalent to the taxable income
of the corporation. 29 Hence, to avoid the personal holding company
status, the corporation must have a sufficient number of shareholders
to avoid the stock ownership requirements or to insure that no shareholder owns more than twenty-four percent of the stock of the corpo24 In model one the following assumptions are made:
(a) In every instance all benefits already exist for the employees of the self-employed

individual;
(b) The dollar figures used are the amount which in the case of a self-employed person would be his net earnings from self-employment;
(c) The owner or executive wishes to make the maximum and future-protection
contributions;
(d) The taxpayer is married, and has four personal exemption deductions. He elects
to take the standard deduction pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1954 #141. Physicians Management, March 1969 presents many useful models.
25 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 531.
26 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 541.
27 INT. REV, CODE OF 1954 § 542(a).
28 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 543(a)(7).
29 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 545. The taxable income is subject to certain adjust-

ments not considered here.
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ration, thereby avoiding the income requirement. Alternatively, in a
smaller organization the personal holding company status can be simply accepted. The onerous tax can be avoided by carefully programming salaries and distributions to result in a zero undistributed
personal holding company income. Although the professional cannot
accumulate funds in the corporation, he still gains the other significant tax benefits.
Shareholders in high income brackets seek to have their corporations retain profits until such time as their income from other sources
is lower. If the retained profits are not needed in the business for
growth or current operations, the funds might be invested by the corporation. To prevent such tak avoidance there is an accumulated earnings tax. 30 The rate of tax is 271/2% on the first $100,000 of improperly
accumulated taxable income and 381/% on improperly accumulated
taxable income over $100,000. There are two reasons why this tax is
not a severe obstacle to professional corporations. A credit of $100,000
is allowed before computing an improper accumulation. 3 ' Secondly,
professional shareholder-employees will wish to pay out most of the
gross corporate income to themselves as salaries.
Despite the desirability of these tax advantages, the professional
corporations have had great difficulty in attaining them. In order to
understand the problem, one must first view the professional associations in their historical perspective.
THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION PROBLEM

The current definitions of economic entities for federal income
tax classification are:
(A) (1) Person-The term person shall be construed to mean and
include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association,
company or corporation.
(A) (2) Partnership and Partner-The term partnership includes
a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not
within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term partner includes a member in such syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or organization. 2 (Emphasis
added.)
30 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 531.
31 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 535(c).
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 7701(a). These definit.ons have a significant legislative
history. The definitions of person and corporation are substantially the same as provided

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 147

(A) (3) The term "corporation" includes associations, joint stock
companies, and insurance companies.
By this statute, unincorporated associations are taxable as corporations.
A significant anachronism existed in the Revenue Act of 1918 in
the following definition: 33
The term personal service corporation means a corporation whose
income is to be ascribed primarily to the activities of the principal
owners or stockholders who are themselves regularly engaged in
the active conduct of the affairs of the corporation and in which
capital whether invested or borrowed is not a material income
producing factor.
Such corporations had their income taxed as partnerships. a4 Both
the definitions and the tax provision were shortly thereafter extinguished. The Revenue Act of 1921 contained those provisions, but it
specifically called for their expiration on December 31, 1921. 35 Although the reason these provisions were repealed is obscure, 36 since
their lapse, no subsequent revenue act required professional service
corporations to be treated differently than other types of corporations.
When Congress repeals a revenue act without reinstatement in a
similar form, the act and any implications or regulations derived from
it are by necessity repealed. Additionally, if Congress is aware of a
situation and takes no affirmative action, the problem should be treated
as having been considered and subject only to the confines of existing
law. The application of these two principles to the legislative history
of professional service corporations supports a conclusion that profesin the Revenue Act of 1918. (Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1058). Under this
Act partnerships were not defined but were classified and taxed as individuals. The partnership definition first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1932 and was substantially the
same as the current definition. (Revenue Act of 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169, 289, § 1111). This
addition of the partnership classification did not create a new taxable entity. Today partnerships and individuals are still taxed the same, and only corporations, associations, and
trusts are separate taxable entities.
33 Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1059, § 200.
34 Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1070 § 218(e)
35 Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 245 § 218(d).
36 Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations,
49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 617 n.66 (1965). (Hereafter Scallen). Professor Scallen presents a
comprehensive analysis of this statute including interesting excerpts from the committee
reports. He states: The appearance for a short time of the personal service corporation is
significant since Congress thus recognized the existence of presumably a substantial number of personal service businesses, conducted under the form of a corporation. Apparently
it was thought that these businesses should be treated the same as partnerships for one
reason or another. Certainly no doubt remains, if history is any guide, that there can be,
for federal income tax purposes, personal service corporations treated as corporations.
Id. at 618.
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sionals may incorporate and the professional service corporations
should be treated as all other corporations.
The historical development of the professional corporations' and
professional associations' tax status closely follows that of the Internal
Revenue Code. From its inception until 1939, the revenue act did not
impose a highly progressive tax upon the individual's income. Since
1939, individual's income has become subject to an increasingly progressive tax rate. Prior to this time the more onerous tax consequences
had attached to corporate and association status.
Contemporaneous with the changing tax laws, the United States
Supreme Court handed down Morrissey v. Commissioner which considered 37 whether a business trust should be taxed as an association
(which meant corporate treatment) or as a trust. This case established
the basic rule that a trust should be taxed as an association if it resembled a corporation. The Court considered a number of factors important in determining whether an unincorporated trust should be
treated as a trust or association; among these were the ability of the
organization to hold title to property, and the qualities of centralized
management, continuity of life, transferability of interests, and limited
liability.
In the following year, the Treasury Department made its first
attack upon professionals. The medical group in Pelton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 38 operated a medical clinic under a trust
agreement. The government argued that the trust should be treated
as an association, while the doctors argued that they should be subject
only to the personal income tax. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the
clinic was taxable as an association on the ground that the trust carried
on a business enterprise for profit, and it had a substantial resemblance
to a corporation under the Morrissey test.
The Pelton group did not and could not possess the Morrissey
factor of limited liability under state law. However, the fact was held
to be insignificant since an association, which is the entity taxed as a
corporation, is not required to have limited liability. Furthermore the
regulations specifically provided for such groups to be treated as associations "even though under state law such organizations were tech39
nically partnerships." 1
The tax status of a professional group was questioned again in
United States v. Kintner" in which the taxpayer actively sought the
296 U.S. 344 (1935).
38 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
39 Id. at 476.
40 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).

37
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corporate mantle to gain the significant tax advantages made available
by tax law of 1942. 41 Kintner involved a medical group of twenty-four
doctors (in total thirty-eight employees) who had revised their business
structure from partnership to association by an agreement which
followed the format of a corporate charter. The court applied the M6rrissey factors and found the medical group most resembled a corporation and was, therefore taxable as an association. The government
first contended that "the practice of medicine is personal, and that a
corporation cannot engage in such practice." 42 The court rejected this
argument. Subsequently, the Treasury Department announced it
would not accept or follow the Kintner decision. 43 Significantly, the
Treasury did not petition for certiorari.
This rationale was followed in Galt v. United States.44 In that
case, a group of doctors was not allowed to incorporate under state law.
Nevertheless the court held the association was entitled to corporate
tax treatment; the unavailability of a state corporate charter was unimportant. Again the Treasury did not appeal the case.
In response to Galt and Kintner, in 1960, the Treasury "promulgated, under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Treasury Regulations
301.7701-2-(a)(1), (2), and (3), with the purpose of indirectly overturning the decisions in Kintner and Galt. 4 5 Indeed, this purpose was
so obvious that the regulations came to be generally known as the
4' 6
"Kintner Regulations."
THE

KINTNER REGULATIONS

The 1960 Kintner Regulations establish rules making it extremely
difficult for any unincorporated organization to achieve association
status. 4 7 There were no regulations interpreting the term corporation
41 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939 § 165(a) as amended 1942; United States v. Kintner, 216
F.2d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 1954).
42 216 F.2d at 421.
43 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 598.
44 175 F. Stipp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
45 United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
46 Id.
4t Scalien, supra note 36, at 653. This authority has dubbed these sections the AntiKintner Regulations. He presents a comprehensive study of the Treasury regulations
construing the "association" status from their origin to the 1960 Kintner Regulations.
He reaches the compelling conclusion that the Kintner regulations were without precedent
and a complete reversal of the law as established by the Treasury regulations over the
prior forty years. For an argument supporting the regulations see Bittker, Professional
Associations and Federal Income Taxation, 17 TAX LAW REV; 1 (1961) and by the same
author, Professional Service Organizations: A Critique of the Literature, 23 TAx LAw
REv. 429 (1967). Professor Bittker supports the Kintner Regulations on the grounds of
logic and the necessity of adhering to theoretical postulates.
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as used in Section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code until 1965,
when the Treasury added Regulation 301.7701-2(h). This section, concerning the classification of professional service organizations, has been
since held invalid and will be considered later in this article.
Section l(c) of the Kintner Regulations defines the effect of local
48
law. The tax class into which an organization falls is to be determined
under the Internal Revenue Code in order to avoid tax variations
among similar organizations resulting from state law classifications. For
example, it would seem that, although a general partnership will not
be taxed as an association merely because it is so designated by local
law, it might be treated as an association for tax purposes if granted
certain features under state law.
Treasury Regulation 301.7701-2 sets out the features an organization must have to be taxed as an association. These are: (i) associates;
(ii) a business profit motive; (iii) continuity of life; (iv) centralized
management; (v) limited liability; (vi) free transferability of interest.
Obviously, the Kintner Regulations are an enlarged codification of the
Morrissey factors. In order for an organization to be treated as an association it must more resemble a corporation than a partnership or
trust. Characteristics common to both a corporation and a trust or
partnership are disregarded, 49 and remaining attributes of the organization must more resemble corporate characteristics. Continuity of
life,5 0 centralized management, free transferability of interest, are
prime considerations. An organization must have a preponderance of
these features to achieve association status.
Nevertheless, an unincorporated two man medical group won association status, in Foreman v. United States.51 The government argued
that, "since physicians cannot legally form a corporation for the practice of medicine under state law, that, therefore, regardless of whatever
other tests the association might meet, the association could never have
48 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-(1)(c) (1960) which provides: Although it is the Internal
Revenue Code rather than local law which established the tests or standards which will
be applied in determining the classification in which an organization belongs, local law
governs in determining whether the legal relationships which have been established in
the formation of an organization are such that the standards are met. Thus, it is local
law which must be applied in determining such matters as the legal relationship of the
members of the organization among themselves and with the public at large, and the
interests of the members of the organization in its assets.
49 Treas. Reg. 301. 7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
50 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(b) (1960) states:
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire,
ment, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the
organization (2) . . . dissolution means an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a change in the relationship between its members as determined under local law .... ( Emphasis added.)
5' 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
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the requisite substantial resemblance to a corporation required under
the federal statute." 52 This argument was summarily dismissed because
an association was to be determined under the federal criteria. The
government next contended that income earned by professionals was
not the normal type of corporate income, and, therefore, the association
should not be treated as a corporation. The District Court made the
following decision on the point:
The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent when one considers
the large number of corporations presently existing in our economy
whose primary income is earned solely from the personal services
of their employees. The corporate tax status of businesses engaged
in advertising or promotion, investigation, sales, contract janitorial
or secretarial service, to name a few has not been seriously questioned to the court's knowledge.53
In Foreman limited liability was not present, and the features of centralized management, continuity of life, and free transferability of
interests were only theoretically present. In the balance, a majority of
the Kintner Regulation requirements were met. In the historical development of the professional corporation controversy this case is the
last noteworthy decision involving the Kintner Regulations.5 4
THE

1965

REGULATIONS

Although as a general rule corporations are separate taxable entities, a number of pervasive tax law doctrines of judicial origin may
require the incidence of taxation to fall upon the involved individuals.
In Commissioner v. Court Holding Company, the Supreme Court held
that "the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction." 55 Tax avoidance may not be achieved by use of a corporation
which has no business purpose for its existence. 56 When a taxpayer
conducts a transaction for tax purposes in a number of individual
transactions which lack a business purpose, the step transaction doctrine permits the government to collapse the formal steps and to impose
taxation upon the end result as if the simplest route had been taken. 57
Generally in the case of the continuously existing corporation, except
52
5s

Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.

54 A recent case involving a business trust association is Ahola v. United States, 300
F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1969).
55 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
56 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
57 SURREY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1341 (1960 ed. with 1961 supp.).
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in instances where the corporation is in fact a "sham" or without
business purpose, the corporate entity cannot be disregarded and its
income taxed to the shareholders. 58
Since the 1960 regulations were aimed at unincorporated groups,
shortly after their adoption significant developments occurred. Many
states enacted statutes providing for either the incorporation or association of professional people. In 1965, the Treasury Department
attempted another coup d'etat with the promulgation of Treasury
Regulation 301.7701(2)(h) and the amendment of Treasury Regulation
301.7701-1(c). These changes were the Treasury's response to the state
incorporation statutes.5 9 Its purpose was:
an administrative explanation of why professional men cannot,
absent a much more severe departure from the norms of professional regulation enforced by the states and the traditional mode
of organization and operation permitted professional men joined
together in a mutual enterprise, achieve the status of corporations
or associations under the Federal taxing statute.60
With the 1965 amendments, the Treasury Department sought to
achieve a major change in tax law. These Regulations specifically provided that a validly chartered and bona fide corporation would not
necessarily be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. 61 Prior to this
time, such a corporation had never been denied corporate tax status.
The effect of subsection 2(h) was to make it practically impossible for
a professional corporation to achieve corporate tax status. If an em62
ployment relationship was required for ownership or participation,
if upon removal the member had to transfer his stock to another,63 or
if a sale of stock could be made only after approval of the other shareholders, 64 the corporation then could not achieve continuity of life or
free transferability of interest. Nine specific areas of decision are required to be vested in a management group for centralization of management; moreover, it is impossible for the organization to have
centralization of management where the professional employee retains
58 Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); National Investor's
Corp. v. Hoey. 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
59 Empey v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967). The Treasury admitted in its
brief in this case that these regulations were made: "In response to an outpouring of
state legislation authorizing the formation of professional service associations aimed at
providing professional men, such as lawyers or doctors, with the means of achieving corporate or association status for federal tax purposes." Id. at 852.
60 Id.
61 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
62 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
63 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
64 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h)(5) (1965).
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traditional professional responsibility.65 Limited liability requires a
member to be subject to no greater liability than shareholders of an
ordinary business corporation. If a mutual agency relationship exists,
there is no limited liability. There is no free transferability of interest
if the right to share in the profits is contingent upon an employment
relationship, and other members have a right of first refusal. 66
These regulations are obviously an assertion that the Treasury has
the authority to refuse to accept the corporate status of an entity
granted corporate status under state law and to require such an entity
to meet the stringent tests established at this time. Prior to this promulgation, the Treasury never refused such status to a corporation which
had a business purpose.67 The Treasury does not have such broad
authority. Statutory intent seems to require revenue classification of
entities as corporations if they are so labeled under state law.68 It is
true that the federal government does not have to accept a state law
corporation when the entity is in no way a bona fide corporation. However, when a bona fide corporation exists, such recognition is demanded. A distillation of the cases indicates that for tax law purposes
there are only three real factors incident to the recognition of a corporation: limited liability, perpetual existence, and the ability to hold
title. All three factors can exist even in a one-man corporation. Limited
liability will exist if under state law a shareholder employee is not
liable for the debts merely because he is a shareholder. Although he
might be liable for torts he committed as an employee, so long as his
liability for corporate contract debts is limited to the corporate assets,
limited liability will exist. Continuity of life or perpetual existence
must be determined under state law. Similarly questions of title are
65 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965).

66 Treas. Reg. 301.7701-5(ii) (1965).
67 Bittker, supra note 47, at 26; Eaton, supra note 16. This article contains a cogent
argument that state labels (corporation) are effective to confer corporate tax status, and
the Treasury is without authority to refuse such status. At page 34 the authority says
"even a one man incorporated talent such as a cartoonist or actor is recognized as having
corporate status. When Congress in 1937 decided to curtail the tax advantages of incorporating talent it did not redefine these entities as noncorporate, but merely surtaxed
them in certain instances as personal holding companies."
68 Scallen, supra note 36, at 622, makes two pertinent observations.
Taking the plain meaning of the statute and whatever legislative history can be
found, the conclusion can be reached that local law characterization was actually
intended. [And at 653] First, the statutory language refers to corporation in a
way that makes one think Congress merely intended to have Ius look to whether
a state had issued a charter labelled corporation to the organization. Second, the
legislative history reinforces the view that businesses having a corporate charter
were to be classified as corporations, and that the classification problem related
to businesses without corporate charters.
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purely within the realm of local law. If under state law, the corporation
continues to hold title after the death of the stockholder, perpetual
existence is provided. 69
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE

1965

REGULATIONS

The 1965 regulations have been held invalid on various grounds
in fourteen cases to date. 70 With the 1965 amendments invalid, it seems

a necessary consequence that all bona fide professional corporations be
automatically granted corporate tax treatment. Although the Treasury
Department has also argued that the Kintner Regulations are applicable to professional service corporations, the invalidating cases establish
a strong basis for the acceptance of all bona fide professional corporations into the corporate tax status.
In Holder v. United States,71 the government sought to tax an
eleven-man medical clinic organized under the Georgia Professional
Association Act as a partnership. The court, however, found that the
organization met the test of Morrissey and the Kintner Regulations
and,'more significantly, that the 2(h) professional service organization
regulations were invalid. "The principal purpose in forming the association was the business purpose of controlling a sizable and unwieldy
organization and to obtain other benefits, such as limited liability. '72
Since section 2(h) was contrary to the settled construction of the revenue statute, it was held invalid.
Moreover, new paragraph (h) of the regulations is contrary to a
legislative intention evidenced by the statutory definitions which
have remained unchanged for thirty-five years, in the case of the
Codes' definition of the term "partnership" and for forty-nine
years, in the case of the Code's definition of the term corporation.
A regulation which would contradict a statute is invalid.7 3
69 Comment, 24 TAx LAw REV. 291-299 (1969).
70 Empey v. U.S., 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d

157 (10th Cir.
1969); Holder v. U.S., 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.
1969); Kurzner v. U.S., 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969);
O'Neill v. U.S., 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio, 1968); aff'd, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969);
Ahola v. U.S., 300 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1969); Cochran v. U.S., 299 F. Supp. 1113
(D. Ariz. 1969); First Nat'l Bank, etc. v. U.S., - F. Supp. -, 23 AFTR.2d 69-603 (N.D.
Okla. 1969); Kelsey v. U.S., - F. Supp. -, 24 AFTR.2d 69-5468 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Mendelsohn v. U.S., - F. Supp. -, 24 AFTR.2d 69-5471 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Ryan v. U.S. - F.
Supp. -, 24 AFTR.2d 69-5943 (D. Minn. 1969); Smith v. U.S., 301 F. Supp 1016 (S.D.
Fla. 1969); Van Epps v. U.S., 301 F. Supp. 256 (D. Ariz. 1969); Williams v. U.S., 300 F.
Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969); Wallace v. U.S., 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
71 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
72 Id. at 164.
73 Id. at 165.
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Wallace v. United States7 4 gives an additional judicial response
to one argument. In O'Neill v. United States,75 the taxpayer had argued
that Congress sought to control abuse of the corporate status by regulatory statutes such as the reasonable salary limitation, the collapsible
corporation provision, the personal holding company tax, and the accumulated earnings tax. Further, Section 7701 was "not intended as a
regulatory provision but serves only a broad definitional or taxonomical function. ' 76 The Court in Wallace took notice that the purpose
of professional corporation statutes was to afford professionals the opportunity to, operate under the corporate form "so as to gain the tax
benefits. '7 7 Further, this court apparently accepted the O'Neill argument and found the purpose of professional corporation statutes valid.
The District Court in expressing this attitude said:
It may well be argued that the state legislation which has been described opens an undesirable loophole through which professional
people can slip and thereby avoid paying their fair share of the
may be closed by the
national tax burden. If so, that loophole
Congress by appropriate legislation. 78
THE APPELLATE DECISIONS

The first appellate decision adjudicating the tax status of a professional service corporation was Empey v. United States.79 The Drexler

and Wald Professional Company (hereafter DWPC) was originally a
four-man law partnership which incorporated under the Colorado Corporation Code s and Rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. A member's liability was limited to corporate assets so long as
the corporation maintained malpractice insurances. Although the employment contracts gave the directors substantial control over the
employees' work, in routine cases the individual lawyer conducted the
matter and determined the fee without consulting the directors. The
corporation had a perpetual charter under state law. Shares were transferable only to other licensed lawyers and the corporation had a right
of first refusal at the price proposed to be paid by an outside transferee.
At retirement or death the shareholder or his estate had the option to
74 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
75 281 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
76 Id.
77 Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1969).

Id. at 1230.
406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969). The last appellate decision, Holder v. United States,
412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969) affirmed per curiam.
80 Colo. Corp. Code, 2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-10 (1963).
78

79
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have the corporation redeem the shares at book value. Bank loans and
rent contracts were executed in the corporate name without any personal guarantee. Certain officers had the exclusive authority to contract
corporate debts.
The District Court took cognizance of the tax purpose of professional corporation statutes and gave the opinion that the purpose of
the 1965 Treasury Regulation amendments was to prevent professionals from achieving corporate tax treatment. The court held that
the validly incorporated and operating professional corporation could
not be treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Since the Sec. 7701(A)
(2) definition of the term limited itself to unincorporated organizations,
treatment of DWPC as a partenrship would be plainly inconsistent
with the statute. In response to the Treasury's desire, the opinion
states:
The defendant has cited no cases and we have found none which
has construed the term "partnership" to include an "incorporated"
organization, nor had the defendant referred to any legislative history which would indicate a Congressional intent to do so.... The
Court concludes that the Treasury Regulations are inconsistent
with the statute and the judicial construction thereof and that the
Regulations constitute the exercise of a non-delegable legislative
function and are invalid and unenforceable. 8 '
In order to make a complete disposition of the arguments presented, the court assumed the regulations valid and found that DWPC
more resembled a corporation than a partnership.
The Court of Appeals postulated the issue of the case to be
"whether the corporation should be classified for federal income tax
purposes as a corporation or partnership."1 2 The decision encompasses
both the amended Kintner Regulations and the added professional
service organization regulations. The court specifically pointed out that
the regulations under consideration were all of the amendments
wherein the Treasury asserted its authority to refuse recognition to a
corporation which was valid under local law. 3 One could be led to
believe that only the professional service organization regulations
(2)(h) were being held invalid. This erroneous conclusion would lead
to the incorrect deduction that the amendment to section 301.770181 Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851, 853 (D. Colo. 1967).
82 United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
83 Id. at 163. The court states, "The pertinent parts of an amendment to 301.7701-2
applicable to professional service organizations: taxable years, beginning after De..
cember 31, 1964 (301-7701-(2)(a)(5) are set forth in Note 10." Note 10 included 3017701-1(c) on the Effect of Local Law.
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1(c), wherein the Treasury first asserts that it may deny recognition
84
to a corporation valid under local law, was not being held invalid.
The Empey appellate decision holds the amending regulations invalid and also that any professional corporation valid under local law,
and not a sham, must be afforded corporate status for federal income
taxes. Inherent in the rationale of the case is the conclusion that the
Kintner Regulations dealt only with unincorporated associations and
did not intend to establish criteria for testing validity of corporations.
Examination of legislative history brought this judicial determination:
Since 1921, Congress has not seen fit to provide different tax treatment for personal service corporations and other corporations, and
it was not until 1965 that the Treasury attempted ... such distinction.8 5
After explaining that the statutory definition of corporation extended
the class beyond those entities ordinarily corporate, the court said:
Prior to 1965, the Treasury Department consistently treated an
entity chartered and operated in good faith as a corporation under
state law, as a corporation for Federal income tax purposes.86
In the first six months of 1969, two other decisions by Courts-of
Appeals dealt mortal blows to the Treasury Department's position.
United States v. Kurzner 7 and United States v. O'Neill 8s resulted in
taxpayer victories. Kurzner decided that when a state charter provides
a corporation with the opportunity to enjoy the Morrissey factors it
must be accorded corporate tax status. Ownership of property by a
separate legal entity "is inherently a matter of state law. Insofar as an
entity is empowered by the local legislature to hold title to property
of the enterprise, the entity will possess at least one corporate attribute."8 9 Similarly, continuity of life is purely a question of local law.
Morrissey did not require centralized management but only the opportunity to allow for centralized management. With respect to the
84 Id. at 169. With respect to the Kintner Regulations the court said, "However,
they are apparently directed only at unincorporated organizations." And again, two
paragraphs later, "However, the 1960 Regulations, unlike the 1965 amendment thereto,
contain no indication of a change in the long followed administrative practice of treating
a corporation organized and chartered under state law as a corporation for federal income
tax purposes. That was a practice that had been tacitly approved by the Congress by its
reenactment at least eleven times, of the definition of the term 'corporation' in substantially identical language." Id.

85

Id. at 165.

86 Id.
87
88
89

413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
United States v. Kurzner, 413 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir. 1969).
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fourth factor of facilitating "the transfer of beneficial interests without
affecting the continuity of the enterprise," the court in Kurzner places
the emphasis on "facilitate." 9 0 If the corporate form allows transfer of
ownership without requiring dissolution, the feature exists; such transfers do not have to be in fact easy. Finally the criteria of limited liability does not require that an active participant be able to claim the same
protection as a mere investor. 91 Apparently, the government argued
that a corporation must be a 'pure' corporation. The court's reaction
to this theory was:
It would appear to us far preferable to adopt the Supreme Court's
approach in Morrissey, vis, positing as corporate attributes only
those characteristics which all corporations possess. . . .The approach of Professor Bittker and the IRS holds that some traditionally recognized corporations do not rise to the dignity of "pure"
corporations because they do not measure up to the attributes of
the ideal form.
In our view this approach is supported by neither
92
logic nor law.
In sharp contrast to this viewpoint is the decision of O'Neill v.
United States wherein the court states:
The Morrissey case did deal with the definition of "corporation"
under the statute, and we hold that it in no way supports the position of the Government that a corporation under state law must
meet a test of resemblance to some federal standard of corporate93
ness before it will be taxed as a corporation under federal law.
In O'Neil the government refused to acknowledge the corporate status
of a medical group organized under the Ohio Professional Association
Act. The only difference between this corporation and other Ohio
corporations was that only licensed physicians could be shareholders.
The District Court construed the liability provision of the statute to
7gant limited liability. 94 Although the court held Treasury Regulations 301.7701-2(h) invalid as unreasonably discriminatory and an instance of administrative overreaching, the corporation was held to be
a corporation within the confines of Treasury Regulations 301.7701-2
(a-f), the Kintner Regulations. The Court of Appeals went much further by declaring both the Kintner Regulation and the Professional
Service Organization Regulations to be invalid to the extent that they
required a corporation, valid under state law, to be treated in any
90 Id.

at

103.

91 Id.
92

Id. at 110, n.58.

93

410 F.2d 888, 891 (6th Cir. 1969).
O'Neill v. US., 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).

94
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other manner than as a corporation for federal tax purposes. The
statutory foundation and legislative history of the tax statutes illustrate
Congressional intent to treat all valid corporations as corporations in
determining tax status.9 5
The government unsuccessfully advanced two other arguments.
Although there was the difference of ownership requirement between
the professional corporation and other business corporations, limitations on purpose and various other minor restrictions were historically
incident to corporate status. Secondly, the court rejected the theory
that it was merely accepting a state label. "The inquiry is whether the
state granted existence to a corporate entity under the law. The fact
that it limits the corporate properties to 'such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created' has no bearing
96
under the Internal Revenue Code.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On August 8, 1969, the government issued Technical Information
Release 1019. In this announcement, the government conceded that
"organizations of doctors, lawyers, and other professional people organized under state professional association acts will, generally, be treated
as corporations for tax purposes." Secondly, the government stated it
had decided not to apply for certiorari in O'Neill and Kurzner. This
publication created the impression that the government completely
capitulated in its attacks on profesional service corporations. A recent
report states: "This development ended the confrontation with IRS,
so that greater use can now be made of [the New Jersey Profesisonal
Corporation Act]. '9 7 The government's acceptance of professional corporations in TR 1019 was subject to the following reservation: "Obviously, however, the government must reserve the right to conclude
differently in any case that reflects special circumstances not present in
O'Neill and Kurzner."
The meaning of this caveat is now clear. The use of a professional
service corporation may violate the tax doctrine of assignment of income. In Lucas v. Earl,98 an attorney made a valid contract whereby
95 O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 1969).
96 Id. at 898.
97 REPORT OF SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMITTFEE ON INCORPORATION OF ArroRNEYs,

92 N.J.L.J. 737, 742 (Nov. 13, 1969); See also Arthur L. Nims, Professional Service Corporations in NJ., 92 N.J.L.J. 673 (1969).
98 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
99 Id.

COMMENTS

1970]

his future earnings were attributable to himself and his wife jointly.
He argued that he could be taxed on only one-half of this income, since
the other half belonged to his wife. The court held that the revenue
statutes taxed wages "to those who earned them."9 9 "[N]o distinction
can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by
which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which
they grew."' 0 0 In Helvering v. Horst,'0' the donor of matured bond
coupons who retained the bonds was held taxable on the income of
the coupons rather than the donee. In Helvering v. Eubank1°2 an insurance agent made an assignment of commissions to become payable
to him for services he had rendered. The payments were held taxable
to the assignor rather than the assignee. Since these early cases, the doctrine of assignment of income has had a continuing vitality, being
applied in many areas including trusts, oil lease bonus payments, oil
3
production payments, and rent cancellation payments. 0
The doctrine sometimes comes up unexpectedly. Corporations are
normally formed by the exchange of property for stock. Under Section
351 of the Code, 0 4 no gain is recognized to the transferor on the exchange. Nevertheless the transferors of accrued wages and inventory
assets have been taxed on the realized income rather than the corporation.

05

In Jerome J. Roubik,106 the government won its first victory
against professionals. In 1961, four radiologists formed a nominally
capitalized professional corporation. Prior to this time, three of the
doctors had been part-time employees of the fourth. Each shareholderemployee entered into an employment contract which formally gave
the corporation the right to make work assignments, except where the
employee held a full-time position in an institution. The doctors all
maintained independent offices on which they had personal leases.
Office purchases were made under personal contracts. The equipment
in each office was owned by the physicians, and depreciation was taken
100 Id.
101 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
102 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
103 Lyon and Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX. L. REV. 393 (1962).
104 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 351.
105 BITTKER AND EUSTICE,

FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION

OF CORPORATIONS AND

SHARE-

HOLDERS 113 (1966); Baldwin, Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and Mid-Stream

Incorporations,38 U. CINc. L. REV. 96 (1969); this article contains useful analysis of the
problems of incorporation. Careful tax planning is required in this area particularly for
professions; they may wind up with a significant amount of receivables taxed to them
without the offsetting liabilities.
106 53 T.C. No. 36 (Dec. 3, 1969).
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by them personally. They were generally under personal employment
contracts with various hospitals. Although in some cases they took receipts in the corporate name, billing was under their individual names.
Their receipts were deposited in the corporate bank accounts, and
they were reimbursed for their expenses or the corporation directly
paid the expenses. The court considered whether the corporation or the
individuals apart from the corporation were carrying on the business.
The corporate guise was disregarded in a two step analysis. First, the
relationship among the employee-shareholders was purely formal and
without substance; secondly the use of the corporation as a clearing
account with separate bookkeeping had no purpose other than tax
avoidance. The doctors actually earned the income, and attempted to
attribute it to the corporation. Here the corporate form had no
business purpose except the avoidance of individual taxation. A bona
fide employee-corporation relationship did not exist. This distinguishes
Roubik from other recent cases dealing with the professional corporation.
CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Professional Corporation Act enables properly
planned and operated professional corporations to be treated as separate taxable entities. Factors which give substance to the corporate
form, as determined by case law, require special attention. Failure to
plan adequately may result in the application of the doctrine of assignment of income. Since a controversy as to corporate status will normally
involve cumulative annual deficiencies, the cost of error will be great.
Generally, applications of the assignment of income concepts have a
tendency to grow in any given area rather than to remain static. Although the tax benefits more than justify use of the professional corporation, the tax laws of the United States are subject to the demands
of a dynamic society. Any prediction regarding the permanency of a
tax benefit is at best speculative.
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